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Closing the International Tax Gap Via
Cooperation, Not Competition
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
All three major goals of the Volcker task force — reducing tax
evasion and loopholes, simplifying the code, and reducing
corporate welfare — can be advanced by focusing on the
international aspects of the tax gap. These aspects include both
enforcement of existing U.S. law on U.S. residents earning
income overseas (the evasion issue) and reforming deferral for
U.S.-based multinational enterprises (the avoidance issue). To
best advance the task force’s three goals, I would propose a
change in each of these two major international areas.
The Evasion Issue
The recent revelations involving Swiss bank UBS reveal a
fundamental problem in enforcing U.S. tax law on U.S. residents
earning income overseas. Beginning with the enactment of the
portfolio interest exemption in 1984, the United States has
engaged in a race to the bottom designed to encourage residents
of other countries to invest their funds in the United States
without having to report the income to their home jurisdiction.
Thus, we permit those foreign residents to earn investment
income from U.S. sources without meaningful withholding (capi-
tal gains, interest, and royalties are exempt, and dividends can be
replaced with dividend substitutes) and without the U.S. payer
having any information about the real identity of the payee.
(Interest can be paid directly to tax haven corporations, while
royalties and dividends can be paid to qualified intermediaries,
and in both cases the U.S. withholding agent will not know who
the real payee is.)
The problem, as the IRS’s recent pursuit of UBS for noncom-
pliance revealed, is that these rules enable U.S. residents to also
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and
director of the International Tax LLM program at the University of
Michigan.







ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
earn U.S.-source investment income without paying any tax on it.
The provisions that are designed to prevent this, such as legends
on bearer certificates and audits of qualified intermediaries by
foreign auditors, do not work.
The currently fashionable solution is exchange of information.
If all tax havens automatically gave all their data on U.S.
residents to the IRS, the problem would be solved. But that will
never happen, because we cannot make all the havens cooperate.
There is a better solution. The key observation here is that
funds cannot remain in tax havens and be productive; they must
be reinvested into the prosperous and stable economies of the
world (which is why some laundered funds that do remain in the
tax havens earn a negative interest rate). If the rich countries
could agree, they could eliminate the tax havens’ harmful
activities overnight by, for example, imposing a refundable
withholding tax (for example, at 35 percent) on payments to
noncooperating tax havens, or more broadly, to all nontreaty
countries, and by insisting on effective automatic exchange of
information with treaty countries. The withholding tax would be
refunded after a showing that the income was reported to the
country of residence.
The financial services industry would no doubt lobby hard
against such a step, on the grounds that it would induce
investors to shift funds to other OECD member countries.
However, the European Union and Japan both have committed
themselves to taxing their residents on foreign-source interest
income. The EU savings directive, in particular, requires all EU
members to cooperate in the exchange of information or impose
a withholding tax on interest paid to EU residents.
Both the EU and Japan would like to extend this treatment to
income from the United States. This would seem an appropriate
moment for the United States to cooperate with other OECD
member countries in imposing a withholding tax on payments to
tax havens that cannot be induced to cooperate in exchanging
information, without triggering a flow of capital out of the OECD.
The Avoidance Issue
The debate on subpart F has been going on for almost 50 years.
From its enactment in 1962 to 1994, a series of steps were taken
to curtail deferral, without significantly altering the original
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compromise that permitted deferral of most active income. From
1994 to 2006, another series of steps significantly expanded the
scope of deferral, and there is now a push to go further and
exempt dividends from active income.
Exempting dividends makes sense from an economic efficiency
perspective, because the current tax on dividends raises little
revenue while inducing significant behavioral changes. But there
is an obvious alternative: eliminating deferral altogether. That
would result in significant simplification because dividends, in-
terest, and royalties from controlled foreign corporations would
not be taxed, and formulas could be used to allocate deductions,
just as they now are for interest. Also, outbound transfer pricing
would be eliminated, and the foreign tax credit would be greatly
simplified (for example, the tricks designed to obtain credits for
foreign taxes on deferred income would disappear).
The problem, however, as always, is competitiveness: Like
they did in 1961, the U.S.-based MNEs would argue that elimi-
nating deferral would make them noncompetitive, and they
would threaten to migrate.
But this problem, too, has a cooperative solution, namely for
all OECD members to adopt or strengthen their CFC rules.
Because 90 percent or more of MNEs are headquartered in OECD
countries, if all OECD jurisdictions abolished deferral, the com-
petitiveness issue would disappear. Inversion transactions could
be combated with strict residency definitions based on a properly
interpreted managed and controlled standard, because few
MNEs would truly want to set up headquarters in tax havens.
There may be some growth in MNEs based in developing
countries, but economically most MNEs will need to be based in
OECD countries for a long time to come.
In my opinion, the solution to both the evasion and the
avoidance problem is the same: cooperation with other OECD
members, not competition. In a multilateral world, that is the
way to preserve the income tax, which cannot be maintained for
either individuals or corporations if cross-border income is
exempt from taxation.
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